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1 Introduction
During the recent global financial crisis (2007–2009), the large decline in house
prices led many homeowners into negative home equity (NHE). NHE occurs when
the value of the house is lower than the outstanding debt on it. It has been suggested
that the large increase in NHE hindered the mobility of workers and had negative
consequences on the labour market (Stiglitz 2009; Krugman 2010; Katz 2014). The
increase in the proportion of homeowner households with NHE was particularly
high in the Netherlands. Indeed, it increased from less than 10% to more than 20%
in the period 2006–2011. This increase was especially due to homeowners who fell
into NHE as a result of the unexpected decline in house prices.
Several empirical studies have tested the impact of NHE on residential mobility,
with mixed findings. While some studies find that NHE reduces the probability of
moving (Henley 1998; Ferreira et al. 2010;Modestino and Dennett 2013; Andersson
and Mayock 2014), some others find the opposite (Donovan and Schnure 2011;
Schulhofer-Wohl 2011; Coulson and Grieco 2013; Bricker and Bucks 2016).
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However, whether or not homeowners with NHE, also called ‘underwater’
homeowners, are more or less mobile, only limited attention has been devoted
to investigating the effect of NHE on the labour market. To our knowledge, only
Mumford and Schultz (2014) have investigated the relationship between NHE and
job transitions using survey data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The present chapter makes use of Dutch administrative data to estimate the effect of
NHE on job-to-job transitions. This is the first study investigating the impact of NHE
on the labour market based on administrative data. Panel fixed-effects estimation is
carried out by making use of a panel data on Dutch homeowners from the period
2006–2011.
To account for self-selection into NHE based on unobserved characteristics, the
authors consider homeowners who fall into NHE because of an exogenous price
decline and compare them with homeowners with positive home equity (PHE).
The impact of NHE on job mobility is expected to work via the effect on
residential mobility. Although existing evidence on the effect of NHE on residential
mobility is mixed, a negative effect has been found in the Dutch case (van
Veldhuizen et al. 2016). Reduced propensity to relocate should render homeowners
with NHE less likely to change jobs because they are more prone to discard job
opportunities requiring relocation. A reduction in the probability of changing jobs
may prolong inefficient job matches and deprive homeowners of interesting job
opportunities that could have improved the quality of their job match (Munch et
al. 2006, 2008).
The study is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the place of the study in
the literature; Sect. 3 describes the dataset; Sect. 4 describes the methodological
approach; Sect. 5 presents the results, including a robustness analysis; Sect. 6
provides the conclusions; and Sect. 7 reflects on policy lessons learned from this
study.
2 Literature Review and Theoretical Background
The present study is related to two strands of literature. The first deals with the
impact of NHE on residential mobility. The second deals with the impact of
homeownership on labour market outcomes.
In the first strand of literature, there exist theories that describe either a negative
or a positive impact of NHE on residential mobility. On the one hand, three reasons
have been put forward to explain the well-known ‘lock-in effect’, predicting a
negative effect of NHE on residential mobility. First, underwater homeowners may
be less mobile because of liquidity constraints on making a down payment on
a new home (Stein 1995). Second, nominal loss aversion may make underwater
mortgagers less willing to sell their home after its price has fallen (Genesove and
Mayer 2001; Engelhardt 2003; Cunningham and Engelhardt 2008). Third, Chan
(2001) notes that the lock-in effect can be present only in the case of localised price
declines. On the other hand, NHE could provide an incentive to default and hence
could even increase mobility (Coulson and Grieco 2013).
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Several empirical studies have tested the impact of NHE on residential mobility,
with mixed findings reflecting the ambiguity of theoretical predictions. While some
studies find that NHE reduces the probability of moving (Henley 1998; Ferreira et
al. 2010; Modestino and Dennett 2013; Andersson and Mayock 2014), some others
find the opposite (Donovan and Schnure 2011; Schulhofer-Wohl 2011; Coulson
and Grieco 2013; Bricker and Bucks 2016). Ambiguity in results can be related
to the fact that these studies investigate different countries, which differ in their
institutional settings.
A problem with the available evidence is the potential selection of less mobile
individuals into high debt levels. To the authors’ knowledge, there is only one study
that tries to tackle the issue of self-selection: van Veldhuizen et al. (2016) exploit
exogenous switches from PHE to NHE resulting from unexpected decreases in
house prices. They find that households falling into NHE are 18% less likely to
move. This chapter tackles self-selection in a similar way.
In the second strand of literature, since the 1980s many scholars have maintained
that homeownership should impair the functioning of the labour market.1 This claim
is based, to a large extent, on the argument that higher costs for selling and buying
houses render homeowners less mobile, which has become popular under the label
‘Oswald’s thesis’ (Oswald 1996, 1997, 1999; Blanchflower and Oswald 2013).
Reduced residential mobility makes homeowners less prone to relocate for jobs,
and hence they are expected to have higher reservationwages, lower search intensity
and lower job-finding rates for non-local jobs but opposite outcomes for local jobs
(Munch et al. 2008; Morescalchi 2016).
Empirical evidence consistently reports that homeowners are less prone to
relocate for jobs (Henley 1998; Munch et al. 2006; Battu et al. 2008; van Vuuren
2009). Most microeconometric studies have found that unemployment periods of
homeowners are not longer, or even shorter, than those of renters (Goss and Phillips
1997; Coulson and Grieco 2013; Flatau et al. 2003; Munch et al. 2006, 2008; Battu
et al. 2008; van Vuuren 2009; Morescalchi 2016). This evidence has led to the well-
known puzzle of homeowners experiencing shorter unemployment periods despite
being less prone to making job-related moves (Morescalchi 2016).
Fewer microeconometric studies have investigated the impact of homeownership
on transitions from employment. Evidence shows that homeownership reduces
unemployment risks (van Leuvensteijn and Koning 2004; de Graaff et al. 2009; de
Graaff and van Leuvensteijn 2013) as well as the likelihood of job-to-job transitions
for employees. To check if lower job-to-job transitions of homeowners are explained
by lower regional mobility, Battu et al. (2008) and Munch et al. (2008) break down
job-to-job transitions into transitions to local jobs and transitions to jobs associated
with regional relocation. They both find that homeownership reduces the likelihood
of transition to non-local jobs. They also find a negative effect on transitions to local
1See Havet and Penot (2010) for a survey of earlier studies on the effect of homeownership on the
labour market.
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jobs, but this effect is smaller in both studies and not significant in the study by
Battu et al. (2008).
To reconcile the argument underlying Oswald’s thesis and empirical evidence,
some microeconometric studies have made distinctions between outright owners
and mortgagers.2 Unemployed mortgagers should have greater incentives to search
for a job to prevent foreclosure (Rouwendal and Nijkamp 2010). Consistently with
this argument, unemployed mortgagers are found to have the shortest unemploy-
ment duration (Goss and Phillips 1997; Flatau et al. 2003; Brunet et al. 2007; Kantor
et al. 2012) as well as the highest search intensity (Morescalchi 2016).
The two strands of literature described so far have limitations. First, investigation
of the impact of NHE on residential mobility does not explicitly quantify the
consequences for the labour market. Second, existing studies on the effect of
housing tenure on labour market outcomes do not explicitly take into consideration
the role of NHE. The present study fills these gaps by investigating the impact of
NHE on the labour market. The authors are aware of only one study investigating
the relationship between NHE and the labour market: Mumford and Schultz (2014)
investigate the effect of NHE on the probability of becoming unemployed and on
the probability of changing job using survey data from the PSID. They did not find a
significant effect in either case. The present study makes use of administrative data
and is based on a much larger sample, which contains more than 400,000 unique
observations compared with fewer than 8000.
The impact of NHE on job mobility is expected to occur via its effect on
residential mobility. Although existing evidence of the effect of NHE on residential
mobility is mixed, a negative effect has been found in the Dutch case (van
Veldhuizen et al. 2016). Analysis here is therefore based on the assumption that a
negative relationship prevails in the Dutch case. Thus, reduced propensity to relocate
can make homeowners with NHE less likely to change jobs, as they are more prone
to discard job opportunities requiring relocation. The reduction in the probability
of changing jobs may prolong inefficient job matches and deprive homeowners
of interesting job opportunities that could improve the quality of their job match
(Munch et al. 2006, 2008).
3 Dataset and Descriptive Statistics
The analysis in this chapter is based on data from 438,057 individuals followed
during the period 2006–2011. This section describes the most important features
of the data. The dataset is based on the full population of homeowners in the
Netherlands who bought a house after 1995. This section will give an overview
of the construction of the dataset and the most important descriptive statistics.
2Some studies have also compared social renters to private renters (McCormick 1983; Hughes and
McCormick 1987; de Graaff et al. 2009; Flatau et al. 2003; Battu et al. 2008; Morescalchi 2016).
Negative Home Equity and Job Mobility 187
3.1 Constructing the Dataset
The dataset used for the analysis was constructed from multiple independent
administrative data records, which can be obtained from Statistics Netherlands
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS)). CBS provides access to administrative
datasets with information collected from various sources, such as registry records
frommunicipalities or information on individual income based on tax files. The data
are strictly confidential and may be used only for research purposes. The results
may be published only after rigorous verification, which guarantees individual
anonymity. The different datasets can be merged using an encrypted individual
identifier, based on the individual social security number. This makes it possible
to combine several sources of information on the same individual over time.3
In total, 17 independent administrative datasets were merged. These sets contain
information on the individual’s current job, address, house value and household
balance-sheet information, such as income, financial assets and the value of the
mortgage on the house. Information was also obtained on household composition,
including number of individuals living in the household and changes in household
composition, such as through marriage, divorce or registered partnership. Table 1
gives an overview of the most important datasets used in the analysis. The datasets
are presented in the order used during the merging and cleaning process.
For the statistical analysis, a panel of male heads of households during 2006–
2011 was used. To avoid attrition bias, all individuals who were continuously
employed in all years were considered. An individual is defined as being employed
in a certain year if they work for at least 10 months of the year. Robustness checks
with four different employment periods are also reported.
3.2 Dependent Variable
Unique job identifiers from CBS were used at the individual level to identify job-to-
job mobility.4 An indicator variable was constructed that takes the value 1 if a job
identifier changes in a given year with respect to the previous year. The job identifier
was corrected for the following confounding factors: merging of companies, change
of job within a company and renewal of (temporary) contracts at the same company.
3For a very detailed description of the construction of the dataset, see van Veldhuizen et al. (2016).
This study uses their dataset and merges two additional datasets that contain labour market infor-
mation for each individual, namely, the BAANKENMERKENBUS and BAANSOMMENTAB
datasets.
4We used the variable BAANID, which is retrieved from the BAANKENMERKENBUS dataset.
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3.3 Independent Variables
The dataset contains rich information on the balance sheet of the households.
Information was obtained on the outstanding mortgage and the current value of
the house on 1 January in each year. The outstanding value of the mortgage was
extracted from administrative tax records. The value of the property was obtained
using the official valuation of property (waardering onroerende zaken (WOZ)
value), which is estimated by the municipality. Each household in the Netherlands
receives a letter every year with information on the current value of the property.
This is an approximation for the actual market value of the house. The ratio of the
transaction price and the WOZ value in the sample period was 99% (CBS 2014).5
The mortgage loan and the value of the house were used to calculate loan-to-
value ratio (LTV). Individuals were defined as having NHE if the LTV exceeded
100. To capture the effect of NHE, outcomes were compared between underwater
mortgagers and mortgagers with LTVs of less than 100. However, the division
between the two states may depend on unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, two
types of underwater mortgagers were defined. More specifically, the authors distin-
guished between voluntarily and involuntarily underwater households. Individuals
can opt into a high LTV by getting a very large mortgage. An increase in debt may
reflect unwillingness to move in the foreseeable future. In this case, the straight
comparison between underwater mortgagers and those with PHE may simply
capture a different propensity for mobility rather than an impact of NHE.
Individuals were defined as having involuntaryNHE if they experienced a decline
in their house value that was sufficiently large to increase the LTV to above 100. In
cases where an individual’s mortgage went underwater because of a combination of
an increase in the mortgage and a reduction in the house price, they were considered
to have voluntary NHE only if the ratio between the current mortgage and the value
of the year before was also above 100. For individuals who were underwater in the
first year of the sample, this distinction cannot be used. However, if they bought
a house in the first year and the LTV exceeded the cutoff, they were allocated to
the category of those with voluntary NHE. Once an individual was categorised as
underwater, they were defined as being underwater in the same category as long
as the LTV remained above 100. If the LTV fluctuated above or below 100, the
underwater status was updated in accordance with these rules.
5This information was obtained from CBS (2014), p. 8, Table 2.3.2.2. This is the average ratio of
the yearly average transaction price and the yearly average WOZ value in the sample period from
2006 to 2011. To calculate this ratio, the reference date in t + 1 was used as the value is determined
on 1 January each year. Hence the corresponding ratio for the year 2006 is the reference date in
2007.
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To capture the effect of NHE, the relevant comparison was made between
mortgagers who were involuntarily underwater and those with PHE. To distinguish
between voluntarily and involuntarily underwater mortgagers, two binary indicators
were included in the regressions.
The data also contain a large set of control variables. In particular, use was
made of housing tenure in years, household size, disposable real household income,
real financial assets, household composition and changes in household composition,
year and 40 regional indicators (local labour market level, COördinatie Commissie
Regionaal OnderzoeksProgramma (COROP) regions) as control variables.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for each year. The table shows means of the
variables and the corresponding standard errors in parentheses below. There are two
important messages from the descriptive statistics. First, there is a general decline
in job mobility in the sample period. In 2006 about 8.18% of the individuals in the
sample changed job, whereas only 4.39% in 2011. Second, a striking “exogenous”
increase in home equity status was observed. In 2006, only 0.24% of the households
had involuntary NHE. This number increased to 9.7% in 2011. In the same period,
the number of households with voluntary NHE increased only slightly (8.6% in
2006 compared with 10.93% in 2011).
4 Methodology
In estimating the impact of NHE, the authors took into consideration the fact that
the NHE status can be related to unobserved characteristics that in turn may have an
impact on the outcome variable. This issue was tackled using three measures.
First, a panel fixed-effects method was employed to remove the potential
endogeneity bias arising from time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. Second, a
set of control variables was introduced to account for time-varying heterogeneity.
Third, the group of homeowners with NHE was divided into the following two
groups: mortgagers who fell into NHE (1) because of a house price decline and (2)
because of a voluntary increase in the mortgage loan. To capture the impact of NHE,
group (1) was compared with homeowners with PHE. In this way the assignment to
one of the two categories was determined exogenously.
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Fig. 1 No relationship between change and level of average house prices in municipalities. Notes.
The grey line shows a linear regression with 95% confidence intervals
One crucial assumption of the identification was that the change in house prices
was random and unexpected. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the growth
rate and the level of the average house price per municipality in a given year for
the period 2006–2011. The picture that emerges from this figure is that there is no
relationship between the two variables. Coefficients of year-by-year regressions are
also very close to zero and generally non-significant. This evidence suggests that
house prices follow a random walk process, providing support to the assumption
made here.
Using the sample of all employed homeowners in year t, job-to-job transitions
can be modelled by the outcome variable yt + 1, indicating a change of job in the
following year. Hence, the following linear probability model is estimated as:
yit+1 = αi + β1 (InvoluntaryNHEit ) + δ1 (VoluntaryNHEit ) + γXit + it (1)
In Eq. (1), β is the main coefficient of interest. αi is an individual fixed effect,
which captures all time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. The parame-
ter vector γ captures the effects of other observable time-varying characteristics that
are summarised in the matrix Xit (Xit contains also a constant). It contains housing
tenure, disposable household income and household financial assets. Indicator
variables were also included for partnership status, marriage status and divorce
status, as well as indicator variables for household size. In addition, year dummies,
region dummies and region dummies interacted with year dummies were included
to control for potential local labour market shocks, which can vary over time. it is
an error term with the usual assumptions.
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5 Results
5.1 Negative Home Equity and Job-to-Job Mobility
The effect of NHE on job-to-job mobility was analysed. Estimates of parameters in
Eq. (1) are reported in Table 3. Coefficients in Table 3 have to be interpreted in terms
of percentage point changes of the probability of changing jobs in the subsequent
year.
Column 1 reports the results of the baseline specification. This specification con-
tains year dummies and dummies for housing tenure. The main variable of interest
is the home equity status of the household. This is a categorical variable reflecting
three states defined as follows. The first is mortgagers who are underwater because
of a decline in the house price. They are considered to be involuntarily underwater.
The effect of NHE is captured by the coefficient of this indicator. The second category
corresponds tomortgagerswho are underwater because they deliberately chose a high
LTVeither at theveryoutset of purchasing their homeor as a result of an increase in the
mortgage. They are considered to be voluntarily underwater. The third and baseline
category describes the situation in which a household has PHE.
Column 1 shows that NHE reduces the probability of changing jobs in the
following year by 0.339 percentage points. The results remain nearly unchanged
when we add further control variables. In column 2 the study controls for disposable
household income, financial assets and household size.6 The estimates of household
income show a negative association between higher household incomes and the
propensity to change job in the consecutive year. Higher financial assets show a
modest but mostly significant negative association with job mobility.
The results do not change if further controls are added for the change in household
composition in column 3.Namely, three indicator variables are added that capture the
household composition andchanges to thehouseholdcomposition.Adummyvariable
is included that takes thevalue1 if ahouseholdhead is living ina registeredpartnership
or marriage. The other two indicator variables take the value 1 if a household head is
divorced in year t or is going to divorce in the following year.
The results also remain unchanged if the study controls for local labour market
conditions. Since job mobility patterns can differ between labour markets, control
variables are added for local labour market conditions. The Netherland is divided
into 40 local labour markets, named COROP regions. Region dummies as well
as their interactions with year dummies are added in columns 4–6 to control
for differences in labour markets and yearly local shocks, respectively. The same
sequence of regressions is in columns 1–3, so, for example, column 4 contains the
same control variables as column 1. All regressions reveal point estimates that are
very similar to the initial specification in column 1. Column 6 shows that plunging
into NHE is associated with a 0.295 percentage point decrease in the probability
of changing jobs. Since the average probability of changing jobs across all years is
5.65%, this boils down to a relative effect of about 5.2% (0.002950.0565 × 100).
6All financial variables are converted to 2011 euros.
Negative Home Equity and Job Mobility 195
T
ab
le
3
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
of
jo
b-
to
-j
ob
m
ob
il
it
y
1
2
3
4
5
6
N
o
N
H
E
R
ef
er
en
ce
ca
te
go
ry
In
vo
lu
nt
ar
y
N
H
E
−0
.0
03
39
**
−0
.0
02
94
**
−0
.0
02
90
*
−0
.0
03
45
**
−0
.0
02
99
**
−0
.0
02
95
**
(0
.0
01
12
)
(0
.0
01
12
)
(0
.0
01
12
)
(0
.0
01
13
)
(0
.0
01
13
)
(0
.0
01
13
)
V
ol
un
ta
ry
N
H
E
−0
.0
02
35
−0
.0
02
21
−0
.0
02
19
−0
.0
02
46
−0
.0
02
31
−0
.0
02
29
(0
.0
01
38
)
(0
.0
01
38
)
(0
.0
01
38
)
(0
.0
01
38
)
(0
.0
01
38
)
(0
.0
01
38
)
H
H
in
co
m
e
>
20
,0
00
AC
an
d
H
H
in
co
m
e
≤
30
,0
00
AC
−0
.0
09
29
**
−0
.0
09
48
**
−0
.0
09
36
**
−0
.0
09
55
**
(0
.0
01
61
)
(0
.0
01
61
)
(0
.0
01
61
)
(0
.0
01
61
)
H
H
in
co
m
e
>
30
,0
00
AC
an
d
H
H
in
co
m
e
≤
40
,0
00
AC
−0
.0
14
3*
*
−0
.0
14
6*
*
−0
.0
14
4*
*
−0
.0
14
7*
*
(0
.0
01
73
)
(0
.0
01
73
)
(0
.0
01
73
)
(0
.0
01
73
)
H
H
in
co
m
e
>
40
,0
00
AC
an
d
H
H
in
co
m
e
≤
50
,0
00
AC
−0
.0
18
6*
*
−0
.0
18
9*
*
−0
.0
18
8*
*
−0
.0
19
0*
*
(0
.0
01
83
)
(0
.0
01
83
)
(0
.0
01
83
)
(0
.0
01
83
)
H
H
in
co
m
e
>
50
,0
00
AC
−0
.0
21
5*
*
−0
.0
21
8*
*
−0
.0
21
5*
*
−0
.0
21
8*
*
(0
.0
01
93
)
(0
.0
01
93
)
(0
.0
01
93
)
(0
.0
01
93
)
Fi
na
nc
ia
la
ss
et
s
>
10
,0
00
AC
an
d
fin
an
ci
al
as
se
ts
≤
20
,0
00
AC
−0
.0
00
76
1
−0
.0
00
80
2
−0
.0
00
72
1
−0
.0
00
76
2
(0
.0
00
63
2)
(0
.0
00
63
2)
(0
.0
00
63
2)
(0
.0
00
63
2)
Fi
na
nc
ia
la
ss
et
s
>
20
,0
00
AC
an
d
fin
an
ci
al
as
se
ts
≤
30
,0
00
AC
−0
.0
01
64
*
−0
.0
01
69
*
−0
.0
01
58
*
−0
.0
01
64
*
(0
.0
00
79
2)
(0
.0
00
79
2)
(0
.0
00
79
2)
(0
.0
00
79
3)
Fi
na
nc
ia
la
ss
et
s
>
30
,0
00
AC
an
d
fin
an
ci
al
as
se
ts
≤
40
,0
00
AC
−0
.0
02
39
**
−0
.0
02
48
**
−0
.0
02
35
*
−0
.0
02
44
**
(0
.0
00
92
6)
(0
.0
00
92
6)
(0
.0
00
92
6)
(0
.0
00
92
6)
Fi
na
nc
ia
la
ss
et
s
>
40
,0
00
AC
−0
.0
01
86
*
−0
.0
01
96
*
−0
.0
01
80
−0
.0
01
91
*
(0
.0
00
93
6)
(0
.0
00
93
7)
(0
.0
00
93
6)
(0
.0
00
93
7)
D
iv
or
ce
d
−0
.0
09
46
**
−0
.0
09
40
**
(0
.0
01
93
)
(0
.0
01
93
)
196 A. Morescalchi et al.
Pa
rt
ne
r/
m
ar
ri
ed
0.
00
63
0*
*
0.
00
62
5*
*
(0
.0
01
40
)
(0
.0
01
40
)
W
il
ld
iv
or
ce
−0
.0
03
98
*
−0
.0
03
98
*
(0
.0
01
81
)
(0
.0
01
81
)
O
th
er
co
nt
ro
ls
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
R
eg
io
n
du
m
m
ie
s
an
d
re
gi
on
(×
)
ye
ar
du
m
m
ie
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
62
8,
34
2
N
um
be
r
of
in
di
vi
du
al
s
43
8,
05
7
N
ot
es
.T
he
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
re
su
lt
s
fr
om
a
li
ne
ar
pa
ne
lr
eg
re
ss
io
n
w
it
h
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
at
th
e
in
di
vi
du
al
le
ve
l.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
ta
ke
s
th
e
va
lu
e
1
if
an
in
di
vi
du
al
ch
an
ge
s
jo
bs
in
th
e
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
ye
ar
.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
co
nt
ai
n
ye
ar
-fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
co
nt
ro
ls
fo
r
ho
us
in
g
te
nu
re
.
T
he
va
ri
ab
le
s
ho
us
eh
ol
d
(H
H
)
in
co
m
e
an
d
fin
an
ci
al
as
se
ts
ar
e
co
nv
er
te
d
to
20
11
eu
ro
s.
‘O
th
er
co
nt
ro
ls
’
co
nt
ai
n
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
fo
r
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
si
ze
.R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
H
H
ho
us
eh
ol
d,
N
H
E
ne
ga
tiv
e
ho
m
e
eq
ui
ty
*
p
<
0.
01
,*
p
<
0.
05
Negative Home Equity and Job Mobility 197
Fig. 2 Effect of involuntary negative home equity on job-to-job mobility for different periods
of employment. Notes. The figure shows point estimates with 95% confidence intervals of linear
panel regression, with job-to-job mobility as a dependent variable for different samples. The x-axis
indicates the minimum employment length per year. The point estimate for an employment length
of 10 months is from column 6 in Table 2. The full regression results are available upon request
Table 3 also shows no relation between voluntary NHE and job-to-job mobility.
None of the coefficients in columns 1–6 are significantly different from zero.7
5.2 Robustness
A crucial selection was made with regard to the sample about the length of
employment. The main analysis focused on an employment period of at least
10 months in each year. One important question was hence to check if the results
changed if longer or shorter employment periods were allowed.
To address this question, the same analysis was conducted with samples based
on different employment periods. The authors looked at periods of 8, 9, 11 and
12 months of employment in each year and ran the same analysis as in Table 3.
The analysis reveals that the choice of the length of the employment period
does not influence the main results. Figure 2 shows the point estimates with 95%
confidence intervals of the key variable of interest. The x-axis shows the length
7As an alternative estimation, we also run an instrumental variable (IV) regression, pooling the
category of voluntary NHE with the reference category of no NHE. The binary indicator for NHE
has been instrumented with residuals of a house price equation containing the full set of regressors.
The coefficient of the binary indicator is not significant in the second stage, consistent with the fact
that voluntary and involuntary NHE are associated with similar effects in Table 3. Results are
available from the authors on request.
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of employment in each year. Regardless of the choice of employment period, a
statistically significant and negative relation is found between plunging into NHE
and the propensity to change jobs. The figure also shows that the point estimates for
each employment period are not statistically significantly different from each other.
NHE is associated with a moderate decrease in job-to-job mobility.8
6 Summary
This study investigated the effect of NHE status on job-to-job mobility. It used a
Dutch administrative panel dataset of homeowners for the period 2006–2011. The
analysis reveals a small negative effect of NHE on job-to-job mobility. Households
that plunge into NHE involuntary as a result of an unforeseen fall in house prices
are 5.2% less likely to change jobs than households remaining with PHE. No
relationship is found between voluntary NHE and job-to-job mobility.
The effect of NHE on job-to-job mobility is relatively small, especially if
compared with the effect on household residential mobility. There are three main
reasons why the effect might be so small. First, the institutional setup, such as
the National Mortgage Insurance Scheme, covers the mortgage payments in case
of default due to involuntary unemployment. This mitigates the potential risks of
changing jobs as a homeowner.
Second, in the Netherlands, high levels of mortgage debt are not associated
with weak borrower characteristics or higher default probabilities (Mocking and
Overvest 2015). This is one of the key differences from the United States and
some other countries, where high levels of mortgage debt are often associated
with weaker borrower characteristics, such as low income, low socio-economic
background or low educational levels. When the housing market collapsed, many
of these ‘subprime’ mortgages defaulted because many of the mortgagers became
unemployed as a result of their weaker positions in the labour market.
Third, homeowners with NHE might be prone to longer commuting distances.
In this case they might take up new opportunities in distant areas almost as often as
homeowners with positive equity, but avoiding relocation. The metropolitan region
‘Randstad’ covers the four biggest cities in the country: Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
The Hague and Utrecht. In this region the infrastructure is such that individuals do
not have to move when they change jobs. The impact of NHE on commuting is a
topic for future research.
8The full set of regression results of this robustness check is available upon request.
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7 Policy Lessons
The reduced labour mobility of homeowners plunging into NHE can have adverse
effects on the economy through reduced labour market matching efficiency, which
can lead to lower productivity levels. Two types of policies can be identified to
reduce these adverse effects: policies targeted at homeowners facing negative equity
and policies targeted at the flow of future homeowners with low equity levels.
Policies regarding homeowners facing negative equity could be aimed at reduc-
ing barriers to refinancing of residual debt. In general, mortgage lenders typically
do not (re)finance high LTVs. In the United States, most mortgage lenders will
not finance over 80% loan-to-home value, whereas in the Netherlands the cutoff
is 101%. Policies to refinance underwater mortgages could be government-run pro-
grammes that offer high LTV loans, like the Home Affordable Refinance Program
(HARP) in the United States, which offers loans with LTVs up to 125% to cover the
home’s reduced value. In addition to such government-run programmes, another
policy could be to make the interest paid on the refinanced debt tax deductible.
This is done in the Netherlands, for example, to incentivise households to accelerate
repayments of residual debt. Finally, governments could reduce transaction costs by
lowering stamp duty on residential moves that accompany job changes.
Policies aimed at the future flow of homeowners with low equity levels are
typically targeted at reducing the incentives to enter into high mortgage debts.
This can be achieved by lowering mortgage interest-rate deductions, which are
typically found in some advanced economies (such as the United States and the
Netherlands). A home mortgage interest deduction allows taxpayers who own their
homes to reduce their taxable income by the amount of interest paid on the loan
that is secured by their principal residence. An additional regulatory policy could be
(the introduction of) stricter mortgage standards, such as limits on loan-to-value
or loan-to-income ratios. These macroprudential tools are frequently considered
to dampen credit growth and avoid boom and bust cycles on housing markets.
However, the institutional setting should be taken into consideration when planning
restrictions in the availability of credit. In the Netherlands, for example, households
face relatively large mandatory pension savings that restrict any additional savings
for most households, which could lead to reduced access to the housing market (van
Veldhuizen et al. 2015).
Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Michiel Bijlsma, Jonneke Bolhaar, Sander
Gerritsen and RemcoMocking for helpful comments. The codes used to construct the dataset and to
conduct the analysis are available upon request. The data used for analysis are strictly confidential
and available only for personally registered users of Statistics Netherlands (CBS-remote access).
The authors will provide all necessary assistance to gain access to the data. All remaining errors
are their own.
200 A. Morescalchi et al.
References
Andersson F, Mayock M (2014) How does home equity affect mobility? J Urban Econ 84:23–39
Battu H, Ma A, Phimister E (2008) Housing tenure, job mobility and unemployment in the UK.
Econ J 118(527):311–328
Blanchflower DG, Oswald AJ (2013) Does high home-ownership impair the labor market? NBER
Working Paper No 19079. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge
Bricker J, Bucks B (2016) Negative home equity, economic insecurity, and household mobility
over the Great Recession. J Urban Econ 91:1–12
Brunet C, Clark AE, Lesueur J-Y (2007) Statut résidentiel et durée de chômage en France et au
Royaume-Uni. Rev Fr Econ 22(2):165–190
CBS (Statistics Netherlands) (2014) Prijsindex Bestaande Koopwoningen: methodebeschrijving.
CBS, The Hague
Chan S (2001) Spatial lock-in: do falling house prices constrain residential mobility? J Urban Econ
49(3):567–586
Coulson NE, Grieco PLE (2013) Mobility and mortgages: evidence from the PSID. Reg Sci Urban
Econ 43(1):1–7
Cunningham CR, Engelhardt GV (2008) Housing capital-gains taxation and homeowner mobility:
evidence from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. J Urban Econ 63(3):803–815
de Graaff T, Van Leuvensteijn M (2013) A European cross-country comparison of the impact of
homeownership and transaction costs on job tenure. Reg Stud 47(9):1443–1461
de Graaff T, Van Leuvensteijn M, van Ewijk C (2009) Homeownership, social renting and labor
mobility across Europe. In: van Ewijk C, Van Leuvensteijn M (eds) Homeownership and the
labour market in Europe. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 53–81
Donovan C, Schnure C (2011) Locked in the house: do underwater mortgages deduce labor market
mobility? https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1856073
Engelhardt GV (2003) Nominal loss aversion, housing equity constraints, and household mobility:
evidence from the United States. J Urban Econ 53(1):171–195
Ferreira F, Gyourko J, Tracy J (2010) Housing busts and household mobility. J Urban Econ
68(1):34–45
Flatau P, Forbes M, Hendershott PH (2003) Homeownership and unemployment: the roles of
leverage and public housing. NBER Working Paper No 10021. National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge
Genesove D, Mayer C (2001) Loss aversion and seller behavior: evidence from the housing market.
Q J Econ 116(4):1233–1260
Goss EP, Phillips JM (1997) The impact of home ownership on the duration of unemployment.
Rev Reg Stud 27(1):9
Havet N, Penot A (2010) Does homeownership harm labour market performances? A survey.
doi:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1625248
Henley A (1998) Residential mobility, housing equity and the labour market. Econ J 108(447):414–
427
Hughes G, McCormick B (1987) Housing markets, unemployment and labour market flexibility in
the UK. Eur Econ Rev 31(3):615–641
Kantor Y, Nijkamp P, Rouwendal J (2012) Homeownership, unemployment and commuting
distances. doi:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2327010
Katz L (2014) Long-term unemployment in the Great Recession. Harvard University, Cambridge
Krugman P (2010) Beveridge worries. New York Times, 29 July 2010. http://
krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/beveridge-worries/?_r=0. Accessed 24 Jul 2017
McCormick B (1983) Housing and unemployment in Great Britain. Oxford Econ Pap 35:283–305
Mocking R, Overvest B (2015) Estimating the impact of forced sales on house prices.
CPB Discussion Paper. CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. http://
econpapers.repec.org/paper/cpbdiscus/304.htm. Accessed 24 Jul 2017
Negative Home Equity and Job Mobility 201
Modestino AS, Dennett J (2013) Are American homeowners locked into their houses? The impact
of housing market conditions on state-to-state migration. Reg Sci Urban Econ 43(2):322–337
Morescalchi A (2016) The puzzle of job search and housing tenure: a reconciliation of theory and
empirical evidence. J Reg Sci 56(2):288–312
Mumford KJ., Schultz K (2014) The effect of underwater mortgages on unemployment.
Columbia University, New York. http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/kjmumfor/papers/
Underwater_and_Unemployed.pdf. Accessed 24 Jul 2017
Munch JR, Rosholm M, Svarer M (2006) Are homeowners really more unemployed? Econ J
116(514):991–1013
Munch JR, Rosholm M, Svarer M (2008) Home ownership, job duration, and wages. J Urban Econ
63(1):130–145
Oswald AJ (1996) A conjecture on the explanation for high unemployment in the industrialized
nations: part 1. University of Warwick, Coventry
Oswald AJ (1997) Thoughts on NAIRU. J Econ Perspect 11(4):227–228
Oswald AJ (1999) The housing market and Europe’s unemployment: a non-technical paper.
University of Warwick, Coventry
Rouwendal J, Nijkamp P (2010) Homeownership and labour-market behaviour: interpreting the
evidence. Environ Plan A 42(2):419–433
Schulhofer-Wohl S (2011) Negative equity does not reduce homeowners’ mobility. NBERWorking
Paper 16701. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. http://www.nber.org/papers/
w16701. Accessed 24 Jul 2017
Stein JC (1995) Prices and trading volume in the housing market: a model with down-payment
effects. Q J Econ 110(2):379–406
Stiglitz JE (2009) The challenge of creating jobs in the aftermath of the ‘Great Recession.’
Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, Washington, DC, 10 Dec 2009
Van Leuvensteijn M, Koning P (2004) The effect of home-ownership on labor mobility in the
Netherlands. J Urban Econ 55(3):580–596
van Veldhuizen S, Groot S, van Dijk M (2015) De economische effecten van een verdere verlaging
van de LTV-limiet (The economic effects of a further reduction of the LTV limit). CPB
Discussion Paper. CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague
van Veldhuizen S, Vogt B, Voogt B (2016) Negative home equity and household mobility: evidence
from administrative data. CPB Discussion Paper No 323. CPB Netherlands Bureau for Eco-
nomic Policy Analysis, The Hague. https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpb/discus/323.html. Accessed 24
Jul 2017
van Vuuren, A (2009) The impact of homeownership on unemployment in the Netherlands. In: van
Ewijk C, van Leuvensteijn M (eds) Homeownership and the labour market in Europe. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, pp 113–136
Andrea Morescalchi is a researcher in Economics working for the European Commission Joint
Research Centre (Ispra, Italy). He holds a degree and a PhD in Economics from the University of
Pisa. After the PhD he worked as post-doc fellow at IMT Lucca and then moved to the JRC. His
main research interests are the interplay between labour, housing and regional economics, impact
evaluation, networks of knowledge and innovation.
Sander van Veldhuizen is heading the research programme public finance at the CPB Nether-
lands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, the Dutch public think-tank for economic policy
research. He obtained a PhD in Applied Mathematics at Delft University of Technology. In the
period 2014–2017, he headed the financial markets research programme at CPB. Before joining
the CPB, he worked as a strategist at the Netherlands Authority for Financial Markets (AFM).
Sander van Veldhuizen has extensive experience in applied economic research and policy analysis
in various field, amongst others financial markets, housing and innovation.
202 A. Morescalchi et al.
Bart Voogt is working at Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) as senior economist. He
is involved in the regulation of the Dutch Telecommunications, Transport and Postal sectors. In
2012 he graduated from the Erasmus University Rotterdam with a PhD in Economics. His main
research interests are industrial organisation, the housing market and regulated markets.
Benedikt Vogt is an applied economist with a broad field of interest for policy-relevant questions.
Since 2014, he has been working as a researcher at the department of market regulation at the CPB
Netherlands Bureau for Economics Policy Analysis. He graduated from the University of Bonn in
2011, and he holds a PhD in Economics of Maastricht University since 2015. His research interests
lay in empirical household finance, behavioural economics and experimental economics.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
